In brief
The General Assembly’s vote marked the 34th time the world has called for an end to the U.S. embargo, but Cuba’s allies saw a notable decline in support. While Cuban officials framed the outcome as a victory for the Cuban people, critics point to shifting positions in Latin America and Europe as evidence of U.S. diplomatic pressure. The future of the embargo remains uncertain as debates over the motivations and the true impact of the sanctions continue.
The United Nations General Assembly in New York approved a resolution calling for the end of the United States embargo against Cuba on October 28, 2026. The motion, titled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba,” passed with 130 votes in favor, 17 against and 25 abstentions, a reduction of 35 supportive votes from the 165 in favor that were recorded in 2025, according to United Press International and the New York Times. The meeting had a turnout of 138 member states, with 21 countries not participating in the vote.
In the days before the vote, Cuban officials amplified the sense of a political struggle. President Miguel Diaz‑Canel declared the resolution a “victory for the heroic Cuban people,” describing Washington’s “economic suffocation, threats and abuse” as a form of collective punishment. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla—presenting the Cuban delegation—denounced the U.S. sanctions as a “naval blockade” and accused the United States of “blackmail” and “genocide.” In a statement posted on X, Rodríguez said, “The consequences fall on people, limit their fundamental human rights, affect third countries and turn the population’s essential needs into instruments of political coercion.”
Opposing the resolution, many of Cuba’s traditional Latin American allies shifted to opposition or abstention. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Paraguay voted against the resolution; Chile, Peru, Honduras and the Dominican Republic abstained; and Colombia—which had supported the measure in 2025—toggled to opposition. In the European bloc, Germany, Italy and Latvia abstained, departing from their previous positions. Conversely, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Nicaragua and Panama maintained their support.
International solidarity efforts outside the Americas also entered the dialogue. On October 22, the National Italy‑Cuba Friendship Association sent a letter to Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani urging a favorable vote, citing the historic Italian stance against U.S. sanctions. Italian academic Luciano Vasapollo echoed that call in an article for the newspaper *Faro di Roma*, warning European governments to reject Washington’s pressure and emphasizing the humanitarian impact of the blockade. Meanwhile, Pan‑Africanist analyst Fortune Madondo urged African leaders to unite in a single voice for Cuba, accusing U.S. officials—specifically Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz—of using threats and blackmail to influence votes. Madondo’s analysis appeared in *Modern Ghana* and *Southern African Eye News*, and he linked the situation to past apartheid sanctions.
The Cuban government’s own economic analysis highlights the tangible losses of the embargo. Ambassador Leyde Rodriguez to the Holy See reported that damages from March 2025 to February 2026 totaled $8.083 billion, a 7 percent increase over the peak a year earlier, and that cumulative losses over decades amount to $178.7 billion in current prices. These figures accompany the UN resolution’s call for an end to the blockade and serve as part of the Cuban narrative framing the embargo as a siege.
Despite the formal passage of the resolution, significant uncertainties remain, as highlighted by the sources. The extent to which the reduction in supportive votes reflects genuine shifts in national policy versus reaction to alleged U.S. diplomatic pressure is contested. The actual impact of the embargo’s end on Cuba’s economy and on its citizens—particularly in light of the reported $179 billion in economic losses—still needs full verification. Additionally, the efficacy of the U.S. “blackmail” and threat tactics, as alleged by Cuban officials and some analysts, has yet to be independently corroborated. The debate continues as member states, scholars, and diplomats deliberate on what the resolution’s passage truly signifies for the future of U.S.–Cuban relations.
