**Unmasking the Shadows: North Korean IT Workers' Secret Lives Abroad**

**A defector sheds light on the covert operations used by North Korean IT workers to generate significant revenue for their government, revealing the complexities of their lives abroad and the risks they face.**

Jin-su, a defector from North Korea, recently shared with the BBC his experience as part of an undercover operation where he worked as a secret IT employee for the regime while living abroad. Over the years, he utilized hundreds of fake identities to secure remote jobs with Western companies, contributing a significant portion of his earnings back to the North Korean state, which has been struggling due to prolonged international sanctions.

In an exclusive account, Jin-su admitted to making around $5,000 (£3,750) monthly from multiple positions in the U.S. and Europe, with some colleagues reportedly earning even more. Undercover North Korean IT workers, like Jin-su, represent just a fraction of the thousands sent abroad to participate in this scheme. Their operations are closely monitored, making them reluctant to share their experiences publicly.

According to Jin-su, approximately 85% of his earnings were sent home, a grim reality he accepted as better than the bleak conditions in North Korea. Roberts from a recent UN Security Council report estimated that secret IT workers could generate between $250 million and $600 million annually for the regime, particularly benefitting from the surge in remote work during the pandemic. While many workers seek steady wages, some have engaged in cyber crimes, including data theft and extortion, significantly impacting U.S. firms.

Jin-su provided insights into the methods North Korean IT workers used to navigate their work. To avoid detection, they impersonated individuals of other nationalities—often recruiting unwitting people in countries like Hungary and Turkey to allow the use of their identities in exchange for a share of the earnings. Through ample deception, these workers secured jobs on platforms typically reserved for Western professionals.

Despite the apparent freedom afforded by remote work, Jin-su remarked on the difficulties many North Korean expatriates encountered while living abroad, noting their limited internet access back home. They could gain greater access to Western media and technology, increasing their awareness of life outside North Korea's oppressive borders. However, defection was rarely considered by most of his colleagues, who preferred the financial lure of returning home, despite remaining unaware of the regime's overarching implications.

In recent conversations with hiring managers, the BBC learned that many suspected candidates were affiliated with North Korea. Issues typically arose during interviews, where attempts at deception were spotted. The potential complications of a candidate being a North Korean worker led some hiring managers to develop tactics for verification, such as requests for daylight visibility during interviews.

Jin-su's case reflects a growing trend in North Korean labor exports, with staggering numbers employed overseas in various sectors. He recounted his own escape from a life of confinement and strict control over personal freedoms, remarking that the operative nature of their work abroad provided them with more awareness of the realities of their homeland.

Now working legitimately following his defection, Jin-su has found stability in his chosen profession, even if it comes with a financial sacrifice compared to his previous roles. Yet, the knowledge he has taken from his prior life remains invaluable. "I had gotten used to making money through illegal means," he said. "Now I put in the hard work and earn the money I deserve." As awareness grows alongside the increasing presence of North Korean operatives in the tech industry, the complexities surrounding their realities continue to unfold.